Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'What do powers do when they are not manifested?'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]