15 ideas
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
| 22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
| 6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |