24 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
13412 | Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf] |
13413 | We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf] |
13411 | If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf] |
13415 | An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |