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All the ideas for 'The Tragedy of Reason', 'fragments/reports' and 'Causation and Explanation'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]