Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Tragedy of Reason', 'General Draft' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]