85 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |