Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'The Mysterious Flame' and 'The Philosopher's Toolkit'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
2546 Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4643 The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
4633 You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
4635 Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
4632 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
4631 In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4638 The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
2544 Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
4647 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4639 Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
4646 Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
4645 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4582 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
4644 A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
4584 The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
4583 How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
4634 Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
4637 To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
2539 Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
2545 Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
2543 Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
2540 Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
4629 Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2547 There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
2542 Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]