Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'' and 'Truth and Meaning'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]