13 ideas
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |