Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' and 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
16477 Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
16484 There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
16486 The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
2947 Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16479 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
16480 A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
16483 Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
16481 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
16487 Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
16475 A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16482 All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
4758 Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
16476 For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
16485 Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
16478 A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]