18 ideas
5182 | Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley] |
6864 | Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley] |
10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
6422 | Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell] |
7966 | Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
6404 | British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling] |
22299 | Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter] |
21343 | Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
6406 | Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley] |