16 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |