14 ideas
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
| 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
| 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
| 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |