33 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |