34 ideas
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
| 7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
| 7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
| 7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
| 7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
| 7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
| 7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
| 7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
| 7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
| 7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
| 23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
| 23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
| 23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
| 23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
| 23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
| 23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
| 23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
| 23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
| 23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
| 23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
| 23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
| 23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
| 23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
| 23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
| 23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
| 23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
| 23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
| 23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
| 23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
| 23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
| 23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
| 23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
| 7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |