65 ideas
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
| 20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
| 20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
| 20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
| 20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
| 20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
| 21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
| 21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
| 20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
| 20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
| 20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
| 20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
| 20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
| 20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
| 20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
| 20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
| 21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
| 20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
| 20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
| 20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
| 20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |