15 ideas
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |