16 ideas
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |