18 ideas
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |