Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]