Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'The Justification of Deduction' and 'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19066 Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
19067 A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
19060 Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11066 Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
19058 Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
19063 Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
19059 In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
19062 Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
19065 Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
19061 An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064 Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]