Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sameness and Substance', 'Writing the Book of the World' and 'Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


79 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic cannot express 'Everyone loves someone' [White,RM]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]