19 ideas
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |