13 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |