15 ideas
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 18203 | Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré] |
| 10502 | We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
| 18258 | We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 16784 | Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
| 10499 | We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
| 10501 | A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
| 10500 | No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |