Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining Explanation', 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root'' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
17082 Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4187 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4192 All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
4190 All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17087 The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17092 An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17090 Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17094 The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17088 Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17089 Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
4191 What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
21368 The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
4189 Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]