60 ideas
| 1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| 1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| 12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
| 15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
| 9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
| 9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
| 9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
| 9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
| 1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
| 1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
| 19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
| 1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
| 7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
| 9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
| 1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
| 9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
| 14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
| 7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
| 8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
| 17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
| 1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |