11 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |