21 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |