Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining Explanation', 'Reply to Fourth Objections' and 'The Disorder of Things'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
17082 Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17087 The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17092 An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17090 Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17094 The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17088 Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17089 Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
3643 The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]