16 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |