15 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |