Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory', 'Mental Content' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]