Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics', 'Discourse on Metaphysics' and 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]