Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Ordinary Objects' and 'Causation and Laws of Nature'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14480 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
14471 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14493 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
14491 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
14489 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
14478 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
14466 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14488 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7667 There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]