25 ideas
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
7667 | There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin] |