Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Guide to Ground' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7667 There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]