Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237 Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7667 There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233 A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236 People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6235 Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
6232 Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5642 For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]