27 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |