45 ideas
| 19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
| 17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
| 17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
| 17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
| 17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
| 17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
| 17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
| 17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
| 17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
| 17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
| 17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
| 17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
| 17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
| 17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
| 17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |