Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wisdom', 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions' and 'Logical Necessity'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
19695 The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
17990 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
17991 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]