18 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |