48 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |