13 ideas
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| 13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
| 9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
| 9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
| 9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |