Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Unimportance of Identity', 'The Mental Life of Some Machines' and 'Occasions of Identity'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]