17 ideas
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
15313 | By 'force' I mean the sources of all actions - sometimes called 'powers' by their outcomes [Breheny] |