11 ideas
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
5997 | Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |