Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Soul (frags)', 'Action' and 'Euthydemus'

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16120 Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
303 Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5997 Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
302 What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
301 Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
305 Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]