15 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |