11 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |